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    The most significant feature of contemporary liberalism in America and to a similar 
extent Great Britain is the diminishing importance of economics, especially free market 
capitalism, to the doctrine. This perhaps does not imply that there has been a departure 
from individualism, the new liberals in America are as anxious as ever to protect the 
'rights'  of persons against the power of the state. But this natural right does not extend to 
economics: the right to own property and start a business has become a privilege granted 
by the state; which it can regulate, control and ultimately withdraw at any time. 
Liberalism in the nineteenth century began as a doctrine that wanted to keep government 
out of commerce, this was never more clearly illustrated in the long campaign for free 
international trade and in its fierce critique of the unjustified privileges of landowners. 
But now modern liberals want to admit the state into almost every activity of a person's 
life except for private, usually sexual, matters and freedom of expression. The  US 
Supreme Court said in a case in 19381 that it would disclaim any authority to protect 
constitutionally economic liberty, such matters could be safely left to the legislature(s), 
but it would zealously guard individual civil liberties against any unjustified intrusion by  
elected bodies.  
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    In one area especially has the enhanced role for the state in social  and economic 
matters been welcomed by modern liberals, that is welfare. In the nineteenth century 
social welfare was mainly, though not entirely, a function of the spontaneous market. 
Individual exchange under a rule of law that sedulously protected private property would 
ensure the efficient allocation of economic resources and the promotion of social utility 
or welfare. Individuals, in such circumstances, could look after their own welfare and 
provide for education and health through voluntary action (even if it were not always 
done by market pricing). Those who could not make their own way in the world  were 
dependent on voluntary charity. It is true that in the nineteenth century there were some 
minor public activities for welfare, mainly in Britain through the Poor Law legislation of 
1834, but these were carefully designed to overcome the phenomenon of moral hazard  
which had bedevilled earlier Poor Law arrangements2. Moral hazard occurs when well-
meaning policies to help a deprived group encourage the size of that group to grow. The 
phenomenon is an unchanging feature of human nature. But at the turn of the nineteenth 
century things began too change, both philosophically and in terms of practical politics, 
for liberals. Welfare became a part of public policy; without any of the restraints that had 
accompanied previous welfare interventions. 
    A Liberal Government was elected in 1906 with an extraordinarily radical agenda of 
social reform which was based on certain philosophical ideas involving social welfare 
which bore no resemblance to nineteenth century or 'Manchester' liberalism. Old age 
pensions (then non-contributory) were introduced in 1908 and widespread social 
insurance (covering health and unemployment) was made compulsory 1911 (thus 
replacing the myriad of private and voluntary schemes that were flourishing at the time3). 
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This process continued remorselessly throughout the twentieth century so that the state 
became heavily involved in health care (the coercive state often being almost, but not 
entirely, the sole public supplier, as in Britain), in education and in most aspects of a 
person’s life. Most of  Europe went in the same direction as Britain (Bismark's Germany 
was actually the pioneer in social insurance-based welfare) and while much of the 
modern welfare state was inspired  and implemented by socialists the new liberals were 
deeply involved in its development and in its intellectual defence.  Indeed, the debate that 
has reopened about welfare in Britain and America has largely echoed the arguments that 
took place earlier in the twentieth century, and the position adopted and defended by new 
liberals, at the beginning of the twentieth century has been challenged. These ideological 
disputes concerned the nature of human liberty, the definition of a 'public good', the 
justification in liberal terms of some redistribution and, overall, the legitimate role of the 
state. 
Early Liberal Justifications of the Welfare State 
    The reorientation of liberalism that took place at the end of the nineteenth century had 
its origins in a peculiarly Anglicised version of German Hegelianism. The philosopher, T. 
H. Green, in a famous essay, ‘Liberal Legislation and Freedom of Contract’, wrote that: 
‘When we speak of freedom, we should consider carefully what we mean by it. We do 
not mean merely freedom from constraint or compulsion. We do not mean merely 
freedom to do as we like irrespective of what it is that we like…..When we speak of 
freedom….we mean a positive power or capacity of doing something worth doing or 
enjoying and that too, something that we do or enjoy in common with others’.4 Although 
Green had little interest in public policy, that quotation reveals how far the doctrine was 
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moving from its roots. Notice the clear diminution of the importance of freedom of 
contract. Under Manchester liberalism, each person was assumed to be a responsible 
agent whose preferences represented his genuine choices, he was a rational person who 
was expected to take responsibility for his actions and leaving a person free to choose 
would not only guarantee social utility it would also educate that person without any help 
from outside sources, such as the state. A person could take care of his own health care, 
the education of his children and his old age. But under Green’s liberalism, choice must 
be socialised, i.e. made compatible with collective goals and freedom made ‘positive’ and 
directed towards higher ‘rational’ ends. A person who wasted his resources on subjective 
preferences would not be truly free. Indeed, there could be state interference with free 
contract if the parties to the contract were vastly unequal, e.g. powerful employer and 
helpless employee; such justified infringements of ‘negative’ liberty actually improved 
the freedom of those, the employers, who might gain subjectively from the enforcement 
of contract. Traditional liberalism now became known as classical liberalism. 
    It was Green’s follower, L. T. Hobhouse, who completed the redefinition of liberalism 
in terms of welfare. In a book Liberalism,5 first published in 1911, he detailed a 
theoretical welfare state encompassing equality, income redistribution and a positive role 
for the state in the direct provision of  welfare goods. Henceforth public goods were not 
limited to things like defence and clean air, which for technical reasons could not be 
supplied by the market (all of which had been long conceded by classical liberalism) but 
now included direct welfare services which had historically been delivered by the market 
or some other form of voluntary action. They did not have the features of non-rivalness 
and non-excludability (out of which a genuine theory of public goods is constructed). The 
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provision of welfare was deliberately taken out of the price system. The new liberalism of 
Hobhouse and others did not limit public action for the relief of poverty for a very small 
minority but extended it to everyone for purely redistributive  purposes. He claimed that: 
‘liberty without equality is a name of noble sound and squalid result’6.   
    This then was the implicit or explicit social philosophy around which the modern 
theory of the welfare state was constructed. Welfare became detached from economics, or 
the Paretian conditions for an efficient allocation of resources, and was attached to 
subjective notions of ‘well-being’ or the ‘social good’ which had an existence apart from 
individual preferences. The maximisation of the latter might  result in the long-term harm 
to a person’s true interests. There was then an element of paternalism  in the new 
liberalism: people could not be relied to spend their incomes rationally on education and 
health, or save for their old age, the state had to do it for them through the tax and social 
security system: this is ‘churning’, taxes are collected and the services are then provided 
by the state with little involvement of citizens except as donors (taxpayers) and 
recipients.   
    This form of welfare spread throughout the western world in the twentieth century, 
especially after the second world war. Its progress was certainly hastened by the onset of 
the Great Depression in the early 1930s. This had two very serious effects on traditional 
or classical liberalism. First, it gave the impression that a free market economy was not 
self-correcting, that it would not equilibrate at the full employment of all resources but 
would endogenously generate unemployment and other dislocations. Such phenomena 
required the active involvement of the state if a technical Pareto-efficient outcome were 
to be secured. Indeed, monetarist (and  Austrian or Hayekian) explanations of the 
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Depression were simply ignored in the onslaught of Keynesianism. Second, it was argued 
that the resulting social distress could only be alleviated by active state involvement in 
social welfare. For example, no private unemployment insurance system could cope with 
worklessness on the scale of the 1930s and no private (or charitable) arrangements for, 
say, health, poverty and old age could handle the exigencies of fortune that would 
confront the unfortunate victims of  apparently random economic events. Everybody had 
to be corralled into the state system. Even in America the New Deal brought the country 
some way towards European welfare states (a process completed by President Johnson’s 
Great Society in the 1960s), especially its Social Security Act (1935) which provided 
compulsory social security (old age pensions and some unemployment benefit). The loss 
of economic liberty that such welfarism entailed was not noticed by the new liberals 
precisely because  by then economic freedom had ceased to be a significant part of the 
litany of liberalism. The only connection between this form of liberalism and the older 
variety was that it was grafted onto liberal orders that managed to preserve the traditional 
civil liberties and the formalities of the rule of law. It was the West’s alternative to 
Marxism and totalitarianism. It is true that some traditional liberals like Hayek actually 
detected a causal connection between modest forms of intervention, e.g. in social welfare, 
and the onset of totalitarianism. But The Road to Serfdom was not taken seriously: the 
rise of totalitarianism was explained in somewhat grander terms than the introduction of a 
modest social security tax and the more or less compulsory state health care in Britain 
was never connected with the Gulag. 
    The only European country that resisted the march towards welfare state paternalism 
was the then West  Germany. The Ordoliberals, who were close to classical liberalism 
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had a significant influence on the post-war finance minister (and later Chancellor) 
Ludwig Erhard. Although the Bismarckian social insurance state was continued with it 
was not initially expanded, public spending remained around 30% of GDP, for a long 
period and the country showed some resistance to an inclusive and comprehensive 
welfare system but this weakened after his departure. By the end of the 1960s West 
Germany was resembling an orthodox welfare state, with an expanded and very generous 
pension system, and the new form of liberalism that accompanied it. 
    Still, classical liberal critiques of the welfare state came into their own as these social 
systems matured and began to display more openly the signs of social malaise in the late 
1970s that had been diagnosed long ago. But the attack on state welfare  mounted by 
classical liberals has to be carefully diagnosed; for it is not the case that classical liberals 
are opposed to all aspects of state welfare: it was a rare thinker who showed complete  
indifference to remediable suffering and whose hostility to the state was so great that he 
would abjure all forms of aid that had to be paid for from even minor coercive taxation. 
To understand fully the classical liberal argument about welfare we have to make a 
distinction between two forms of state intervention to produce social  well-being: the 
‘residual’ welfare state and the ‘institutional’ welfare state. In general, most classical  
liberals approve of the former which guarantees some relief for the demonstrably indigent 
(indeed, they might even say that it is not redistributive since everybody would like to see 
the really poor taken care of). Though some more conservative critics of the welfare state 
have worried that payment to the poor, unaccompanied by reciprocal obligations from the 
recipients, might produce some socially dysfunctional  behaviour. But almost all classical 
liberals (with minor exceptions) are unremittingly hostile to the institutional welfare state 
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which provides, through compulsion, a whole range of welfare services from health care 
to pensions (and often including education). It is the kind of state which Hobhouse 
theorised. These policies reduce individual liberty, turn out to be immensely costly and 
increase the size of government producing uncontrollable rent-seeking by state welfare 
workers. The latter became propagandists for the expansion of  the welfare state. 
Classical Liberals and the Residual Welfare State 
    This form of welfare envisages the payment to the poor of a cash supplement if their 
incomes should fall below a certain level. It is sometimes called a Guaranteed Minimum 
Income or a Negative Income Tax. In its purest form all aspects of the institutional 
welfare state would be abolished and people would be free to spend their additional 
income on whatever they like, be it education, health care or even sex, drugs and 
rock’n’roll.  President Nixon presented a bill to Congress, the Family Assistance Plan, 
which was in essence a Negative Income Tax. Although it would not have abolished 
social security, all the myriad welfare schemes that had emerged from President 
Johnson’s Great Society would have been converted into cash payments (and, as a 
belated tribute to federalism, most welfare would have been passed to the component 
states in the Union. Still, there is no Negative Income Tax, even though the American 
system has always  had a range of cash payments; Britain has a costly one in the form of 
Income Support. 
    The Negative Income Tax has always had an appeal (though it as perhaps superficial) 
for classical liberals. It preserves liberty of choice for the recipients, it cuts down on 
labour resources and administrative costs, and by limiting welfare to cash it more or less 
eliminates discretion (and paternalism) on the part of the provider (the state). Although 
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some allowance would have to be made for family circumstances and personal conditions 
(the claimant might be permanently disabled) in the calculation of the cash payment, this 
is reduced to the minimum (unlike in the institutional welfare state). Indeed, the 
promotion of equality is abjured and the elimination of poverty becomes the only target 
for policy makers. Furthermore, and more controversially, proponents of the Negative 
Income Tax claim that it represents people’s altruistic preferences. It is not redistributive 
because we actually do want to relieve suffering and feel better off when that happens. 
But if there are such preferences why are they not satisfied in the private world of 
charity? Why do we require the coercive power of the state to be moral? 
    Milton Friedman in his Capitalism and Freedom confronts this problem directly and 
tries to argue that this form of welfare makes everybody better off, including the donor 
(the taxpayer). In  famous passage, he writes: 
    I am distressed by the sight of poverty; I am benefited by its alleviation; the benefits of 
other 
    people’s charity therefore partly accrue to me. To put it differently we might all of us 
be willing 
     To contribute to the relief of poverty, provided everyone else did.7 
In other words, the relief of poverty is a public good, like clean air or national defence, 
and it is the assurance problem that prevents its being supplied by the market. Add to 
that, the point that people might be deterred from giving because their contribution makes 
little difference to the problem, and  the existence of some state welfare is then a 
correction for  market failure. This is a bold argument but it doesn’t work.8 It is fairly 
easy to show that the relief of poverty is not a public good like clean air. For one thing, 
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Friedman has not demonstrated that there is an altruistic sentiment, that our contributions 
would increase as our incomes rose and it is only the assurance problem that prevents that 
happening. While it is true that charitable contributions tend to rise as the tax rate falls, 
this is a very speculative argument. And why should there be an assurance problem? One 
person’s contribution does make a difference; the relief of poverty is not like the 
provision of clean air, which is rarely in any one person’s interest to supply. And 
according to Friedman’s theory, there shouldn’t be any charitable giving at all, yet there 
clearly is a vast amount of it in America. Indeed Friedman wants to encourage even more 
of it. More dangerously, there is the potential for a very serious moral hazard problem in 
Friedman’s system. Will not a scheme that requires no reciprocal obligations from the 
welfare recipients simply encourage the size of that group to grow? One answer to this 
would be to keep the value of the Negative Income Tax as low as possible. But that 
would be to punish the genuinely needy so as to deter the welfare parasites. Anyway, it is 
quite likely that electoral competition in a democracy would tend to bid up the value of 
the Negative Income Tax. 
    Most classical liberals reject the Friedman proposal, although the freedom-enhancing 
features of the cash-based residual welfare state still has considerable appeal for 
individualist thinkers. However, the research into the Great Society, which brought about 
a massive expansion9 of American welfare, convinced both classical liberals and 
conservatives that there is something deeply disturbing about the permissive welfare state 
that had developed. As Charles Murray10 and Lawrence Mead11 showed, the existence of 
easily obtainable welfare had turned out to be counter-productive. With no incentives to 
work, individuals found it much easier to defect from employment, marriage and the 
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normal civilized standards of American society declined: particularly disturbing was the 
rise in unmarried motherhood and the emergence of an underclass that never worked but 
simply reproduced itself. The main policy that encouraged this was Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (which was originally a New Deal measure intended to help widows 
and deserted wives). As the conditions of its receipt relaxed12 it became an alternative to 
work and during the highpoint of the Great Society, a generation was growing up which 
had no experience of work; its members were destined to a life of drugs and petty crime. 
The black community was particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of welfare. 
    The intellectual response to all of this was most interesting, for during the long 
gestation period when reform was discussed and debated until its enactment in 1996, the 
pro-welfare lobby played little part. Clinton vetoed the revolutionary reform bill twice, 
but finally approved it as the 1996 election approached; he knew that welfare reform had 
great public support. Charles Murray had argued that it was simply the existence of easily 
available welfare that had caused all he problems. If welfare were to be removed then the 
incentives for indolence and dysfunctional behaviour would be eliminated and people 
would adjust their behaviour accordingly. Murray is, of course, a libertarian who wants 
the removal of government from most activities anyway. He certainly doesn’t think that 
government can make people good citizens; it would be authoritarian of it to try. What it 
can, and should, do is to get out of the way of the natural regenerative forces of a free 
society. It should simply abolish the welfare state, and merely institute temporary 
arrangements for those likely to be adversely affected (in the short run) by such a bold 
measure. Classical liberals like Michael Tanner13 believe that the natural benevolence of 
Americans will always provide enough money for those, perhaps through permanent 
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disability or other unfortunate features that cannot be altered by individual effort, who 
cannot cope with market society. Spontaneous action has been successful in the past and 
had produced none of the deleterious side effects of the welfare state. 
    But it was the conservatives who posed the most effective challenge to the classical 
liberal near-hegemony in the great American welfare debate.  Although Mead thought 
that the welfare state was probably too big he was never very worried about its size or 
about the government control that it invariably involves. His main objection was that it 
presented the recipients of welfare with too much liberty and so far from trying to 
reconcile some welfare with maximum liberty, as Friedman wants to do, he thinks that 
the welfare state is too libertarian already. As he says: ‘The scale of government is an 
issue over which the parties contend. The permissive character of the regime passes 
almost unnoticed’.14 He went on to say that: ‘The solution to the work problem is not in 
freedom but in governance’.15 What also inspired Mead was his demonstration that there 
is no clear causal relationship between dysfunctional behaviour (welfare dependency) and 
the generosity or otherwise of welfare payments The value of welfare went down in the 
late 1970s yet dependency increased dramatically and the rate of unmarried motherhood 
shows no clear correlation with welfare. Indeed,  Mead does not think that the welfare 
problem would be solved by simply  by ending it. That would produce a whole 
generation of alienated inner city derelicts who would be even more addicted to crime, 
drugs and prostitution. The tragedy is that the non-working poor in America have become 
socially incompetent and lack the basic skills to participate in civil society. At least two 
generations of welfare recipients who had received welfare as entitlements, with no 
reciprocal obligations, had produced the malaise of the inner cities in America. Mead 
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became a firm advocate of workfare, which requires the recipient of welfare to perform 
social functions, even if they are economically useless, before welfare can be received. At 
best, workfare  provides a supplement to income earned in the market. 
    In fact, successive legislation in America, including the far-reaching reform of 1996, 
shows a much greater influence of Mead  than either  Murray or Tanner. Welfare has not 
yet been abolished, though that might be the (very) long-term aim of the reform,  but 
entitlements such as AFDC have been eliminated. Its replacement, Temporary Assistance 
to  Needy Families (TANF), is clearly linked to work requirements. It will not be possible 
to stay on welfare for more than five years across a lifetime and never more than two 
years at a stretch. 
    Classical liberalism in America has a slightly disappointing record in welfare. The 
problem in that country was never really the cost of welfare (it was never more the 2% of 
public spending). But since the welfare policies have  been derived  from the  residual 
rather than from the institutional welfare state their poor results need to be explained. The 
expenditure could be justified in Friedman’s terms (despite the theoretical shortcomings 
of his welfare model) because most Americans are benevolent and are disturbed by 
alterable distress. Cash payment does indeed improve the wellbeing of the donor (the 
taxpayer). What disturbs Americans is not the waste but the moral degradation brought 
about by welfare without reciprocal obligations. 
Liberalism and the Institutional Welfare State  
    Welfare states of the European Union are largely institutional and citizens are  bound 
to each other in a great range of publicly supplied welfare goods and services. This, no 
doubt, reflects the more communitarian and less individualistic political and social 
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traditions of European countries. Britain is midway between the two approaches of 
America and Europe; it has a lot of the features of the social insurance financed 
institutional welfare state but also retains a cash redistributive element, Income Support. 
The problems to do with the institutional  welfare are its soaring costs and the lack of 
freedom of choice that it entails. Although it should be pointed out here that most 
European countries have health systems that do involve considerably more freedom than 
the British National Health Service, which is probably the last remaining Stalinist system 
in the developed  world.  
    I assume that there are no behavioural problems to do with the public supply of health 
and pensions (old people, and the sick, making use of public services do not go onto 
drugs as young people tend to do when they are on cash benefits!). Before going on to 
consider the institutional welfare state, it is important to observe that it is just possible to 
find some rational justification for social insurance (and even nationalised health) within 
the tradition of liberal political economy. The collectivised insurance system has often 
been validated on individualistic grounds. It is to do with the problem of  adverse 
selection.  In a purely free market the people most likely to insure against unemployment 
and sickness are obviously those most likely to suffer these two afflictions. The highly 
employable, fit and young would not rationally insure and all of the ‘pooling of risk’ 
advantages of insurance would  be lost; indeed the premiums to those at risk could be 
astronomic. A ‘Beveridge-type’ social insurance could just about be made consistent with 
liberal principles. William Beverage was the founder of the modern British welfare state 
in the postwar period  
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    Some of the problems of private insurance could be overcome by making it 
compulsory, rather like minimum car insurance. People would be compelled to insure 
against unemployment and ill-health yet free to choose what supplier they like. The same 
principle could be applied to old age pensions savings. This would overcome the adverse 
selection problem yet still leave considerable discretion for individuals to select what 
they think is the most appropriate scheme for them. Of course, the compulsory private 
method would still leave individuals free to spend more than the required amount. Such 
an approach would end the monolithic character, and consumer dissatisfaction, associated  
with most institutional welfare states.  
    An important  ‘liberal justification for nationalised health derives from the problem of 
asymmetric information. The doctor always knows more than the patient and in an 
unregulated health market he can make monopoly gains. Thus the fact of America’s 
steadily increasing health costs (14% of GDP compared to Britain’s 6% and France and 
Germany at 9% or 10%) is said to represent market failure, i.e. the free exchange system 
fails to reflect accurately  consumer desires. It never seems to occur to the critics that rich 
Americans might genuinely want to spend that amount on health or that competition 
between doctors could very well enhance consumer choice. Indeed, the ‘rational’ 
undermining of private health and welfare has come about as much from the deliberate 
invention of  'market failure' arguments as it has from straightforward collectivism. 
   In theory, the schemes produced by the institutional welfare state are not supposed to be 
redistributive since citizens have supposedly paid for their benefits through social 
security taxation. This is different from regular state taxation since it is used to finance 
only welfare obligations. Many liberal critics argue that the two taxes ought to be 
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combined since state welfare duties are almost always subsidised by regular taxation 
anyway  and a unified tax system would be more efficient and could direct aid to the 
most needy. However, other more individualistic thinkers argue that separate social 
security tax establishes welfare payments as a form of entitlement for which individuals 
have paid.  Indeed, in their early days, social security systems were a form of saving and 
not all citizens were covered.  But the notion of entitlement was perverted in the 
American welfare system: it simply meant that a welfare payment (AFDC) was 
guaranteed by federal law and could not be abrogated by the states.  
    But compulsory social insurance never fulfilled its aims. It (historically) has rarely 
been self-financing; it tends to lead to unanticipated inequality since costs of living vary 
in different parts of the country while the money is paid out in a uniform manner; it 
reduces private capital formation (indeed, it is established in the US  that recipients of 
pensions would have received much more if their social security  contributions had been 
invested in the stock market) and as it becomes more dependent on general taxation, 
social security  becomes  necessarily redistributive. Furthermore, in the institutional 
welfare state entitlements tend not to be limited to those who have originally paid for the 
schemes but are extended to everyone. All of these factors led to growing fiscal  crises in 
all welfare states and increasing dissatisfaction with the services offered. The National 
Health Service in Britain is totally dependent on central state  money and is therefore 
permanently underfunded. Classical liberals have repeatedly pointed to the illusion that 
the promise of zero-priced health care can be offered to everybody, without rationing, 
when medical technology is rapidly improving and the health costs of an aging  
population are rising inexorably. As classical liberals have constantly stressed, politicians 
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in a democracy are much slower to respond to people’s demands for higher health 
spending than are suppliers in a free market.     
    Another illusion of the institutional welfare state is that it is an efficient instrument for 
producing equality, if that is desired. If health is supplied at zero price to everybody does 
this not mean equal consumption? If education is available to everybody at no direct cost 
won’t that prevent the wealthy buying privileges for their children? But this is not so, for  
although something might be technically available for all it might not be consumed 
equally by all. Research has revealed that in welfare states the better off consume public 
services more than the poor. This is largely because of opportunity cost: a day at the 
doctor’s costs the better off salaried person very little in forgone in income compared to a 
factory worker paid by the hour. Richer families encourage their children to stay at 
school after sixteen and go on to university because they are less in need of an extra 
income. University education itself is available at more or less zero price and the better 
off consume a disproportionate amount. A proper socialist education system would make 
primary and secondary education entirely free (everyone has to send their children to 
school) and university education would be priced. It  was the socialist economist, Julian 
Le Grand, who demonstrated the inegalitarian nature of the institutional welfare state; in 
his The Strategy of Equality he wrote; ‘Policies involving subsidies whose distribution is 
dependent upon people’s decision to consume the good or service favour the better off’.16 
    The pensions issue is certain to be the biggest long-term problem for the institutional 
welfare state. It is likely to be the most costly both in Europe and America. It involves no 
problem of personal morality or social dysfunctioning; although questions of individual 
responsibility for action, of liberty to determine one's own future and the legitimate role 
 18
of the state,  do arise. Classical liberals have used the full battery of modern social 
science in its analysis. This starts from the claim that the traditional arguments for state 
involvement in pensions no longer  hold,  if  they ever did. At one time it was true that 
being old tended to mean being poor. This is no longer the case with the rise of 
occupational pensions and the accumulation of assets over a lifetime. In America 
especially, the elderly have done rather well out of Social Security, though not as well as 
if they had been allowed to invest their funds privately.17 Still, poverty in old age is still 
something of a problem in Britain, though not as severe as it once was. 
    The other argument for state involvement in pensions is superficially a little more 
plausible. It might be the case that people's time preferences are too high, i.e. they 
discount the future at too high a rate and do not save. This leaves a welfare problem for 
young persons. If the elderly know that they will be cared for they will save even less, 
leaving an indefinitely expanding problem for the state and for younger generations. This 
is a form of moral hazard. Therefore everybody must be forced to save. However, 
classical liberals have had no difficulty in showing that the conventional assumptions are 
false. The evidence is that it is governments that have  too high time preferences; their 
time horizons are determined by the date of the next election and they will be tempted to 
burden future generations with heavy pensions costs. This is what has happened in 
America, Europe and Japan (however, in Britain more than half the population are in 
private arrangements. 
    State schemes have never been financed by genuine savings  but by tax transfers from 
young to old. They are validated not by genuine actuarial considerations but by a 
mythical 'contract' between the generations.18 Present workers have to pay for current 
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retirees on the tacit  understanding that they will be generously rewarded when they 
retire. No state pension scheme has ever built up a fund to finance its legal obligations. 
Classical liberals now speak of an impending pensions catastrophe. Later generations will 
lose out as the schemes mature in the context of declining birth rates, a feature of all 
advanced countries. As Carolyn Weaver said:  ‘A decision to increase the tax rate 
represents a collective decision to alter the rates of return between the generations'.19 The 
system is likely to remain since there will always be enough voters who have no 
incentive to vote the system out. It is not surprising that the elderly have a significantly 
higher voting turnout than the young. Only in the unlikely event of an increase in the 
population of the young (or a big increase in immigration) could the system change by 
normal democratic methods. 
    It is hard to imagine that a 'rational' change in the system that would not harm some 
people. Would it be  morally wrong to deny one generation a benefit which it had been 
promised, however unrealistic that promise originally  was? Indeed, the government's 
involvement has not merely created a problem of intergenerational equity but it has also 
undermined liberty and autonomy. Even if the government schemes were organized 
rationally do they not authorize politicians to determine people's time preferences, i.e. 
dictate how they should spend their incomes over their lifetimes? A most illiberal act. 
    Other features of the institutional welfare state involve similar problems of rising  
costs, demographic unpredictability and growing tax resistance, even if they are not as 
spectacular as the pensions example. The creation of the institutional welfare state has in 
the long run produced massive consumer dissatisfaction. While Hayek20 thought that 
there might have been at one time a case for a small government involvement in the 
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institutional welfare state he said this should  temporary and the services ought to be 
returned quickly to the private sector. He saw early on that they were not genuine 
insurance schemes. Neither are they proper  public goods and continued government 
action here is a combination of paternalism, rent-seeking and gross inefficiency. If  the 
state were to exit from the institutional welfare state, higher savings,  more personal 
liberty  and greater efficiency would all result. 
Conclusion 
     We are only just beginning to learn the lessons of ill-thought out welfare systems. The 
analytical and empirical problems were discovered and analysed with the methods of 
traditional or classical liberalism. But since Hobhouse liberalism has been associated with 
a very different doctrine. Only in continental 
 Europe has the doctrine much connection with free markets, private  property rights and 
the rule of law. In the United states liberalism is not far from social democracy. Its 
connection with welfarism  and the welfare state is primarily responsible for this change 
in meaning This is not to say that all classical liberals are opposed to some public 
responsibility for the relief of poverty but they would distinguish this from the 
government supply of a range of welfare goods.  
    The major problems with welfare limited to the relief of poverty are all behavioural, 
not about costs. The cash payment system produces moral hazard on the grand scale and  
generates a plethora of delicate policy issues for the government of inner cities; mainly to 
do with sex, drugs and crime. Because of their belief in individual liberty classical 
liberals have been extremely reluctant to recommend any policy initiatives that look at all 
like paternalism. It may or may not be the case that the withdrawal of all welfare would 
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produce good behaviour, and it may or not be the case that private charity would take 
care of the incurably indigent or incapacitated  but certainly Americans are not prepared 
to take these risks. All the recent reforms, including the major one of 1996, have involved 
government (at the state level) in workfare schemes, job training and so on.  People might 
have lost the opportunity to live off welfare forever but they have not been thrown onto 
the mercies of the free market either. And Americans are still under the illusion that 
certain types of government are not really welfare, especially social security. They are. 
They are redistributive  and potentially immensely costly. The early privatisation of 
social security, a clear inference from classical liberalism, is essential if order is to be 
restored here and future costs avoided. 
    In Europe, spokesmen  for classical liberalism have no doubts that the vast 
bureaucratic structures must be phased out. They are a hindrance to the operation of the 
market system and impose costs on employers which make business uncompetitive in 
world markets. But at least there is some pluralism in Europe, with a variety of groups 
and organisations taking part in the delivery of welfare goods. Health is a the obvious 
example and although the state is involved in its financing to a degree which would 
horrify most classical liberals, it is still much better than in Britain where the monolithic 
public system severely inhibits competition and reduces spending to way below that level 
which citizens wold demand in a free market..  
    The battle against communism has been won but the war against welfare has only just 
begun. All genuine liberals must be prepared for a long campaign.  
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